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ESTABLISHMENT, EXPRESSIVISM, AND FEDERALISM
MARK D. ROSEN*
INTRODUCrION
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes the Establishment Clause applicable "with full force to the
States."1 Call this a "one-size-fits-all" approach. This Article sug-
gests that it may be desirable in the Establishment Clause context to
''size" constitutional limitations to the level of government-federal,
state, or local-that is acting. That is to say, it may be the case that
states or localities should be permitted to regulate in ways that the
federal government cannot, and vice versa. "Sizing" draws on
underutilized flexibility that is inherent in our government's federal
structure. The struggle concerning religion and the state that is
reflected in Establishment Clause disputes is a profoundly cultural
conflict-at stake, in the view of advocates on both sides, is the very
character of citizens and of society-and the cultural dimension of
this struggle is an integral part of the normative justification for sizing
the Establishment Clause.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I clarifies what is at
stake in struggles concerning the proper relation between government
and religion in the Establishment Clause context. It argues that there
are bound to be large-scale cultural winners and losers under con-
temporary Establishment Clause doctrine.
Part II draws on a so-called "expressivist" approach to law to ar-
gue that Part I's conclusion has doctrinal implications. Expressivism
refers to the view that laws frequently reflect, and are generally
* Associate Professor, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology. I
would like to thank Steve Heyman and Dean Krent for very helpful discussions at an early stage
of this project, as well as very helpful comments from Eric Claeys, Margaret Stewart, and Dina
Warner. Many participants at the conference also provided insightful comments, including
Robert C. Post, Steven H. Shiffrin, and Steven D. Smith.
1. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04
(1968) ("Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of
religious theory, doctrine, and practice.") (emphasis added).
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understood to endorse, particular values.2 In so doing, law often
"shapes or reinforces social norms, social forms, or social practices
more generally."'3 Expressivists accordingly believe it necessary to
identify the likely "social meaning" of legal doctrine. 4 After explain-
ing what expressivism is, Part II shows that contemporary Establish-
ment Clause doctrine creates harms from an expressivist perspective.
Understanding these harms requires an appreciation of the way that
social meaning varies depending upon what level of government-
federal, state, or local-is barred from doing the "establishing." A
constitutional rule prohibiting a national church precludes the federal
government from proclaiming that this is a Christian country. A rule
that also disallows the establishment of state or local churches, as our
current doctrine does, expresses wholesale disapproval of the inter-
mixing of secular and religious authority. By contrast, a rule prohibit-
ing a national church but countenancing established local churches-
as was the case from the founding up to the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause against the states'-could be said to express
neutrality on the issue of intermixing insofar as such a rule disallows a
single, nationwide orthodoxy but permits divergent approaches to
flourish at the subfederal level.
Because the social meaning of a prohibition on established
churches varies depending on which level of government is con-
strained, it follows, from an expressivist perspective, that Establish-
ment Clause concerns are implicated differently depending on what
level of government is acting.6 But is this a purely theoretical obser-
vation? After all, one might ask: is it not inevitable that constitu-
2. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 66 (1995).
3. Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1363, 1498-99 (2000) (accurately describing one approach to expressivism, though not
agreeing with expressivism's claims).
4. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 749 (1998) (explaining the connection
between expressive harms and social meaning).
5. Depending on one's view, this occurred either upon the Fourteenth Amendment's
adoption or in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Some scholars have suggested
that the founders did not intend the Establishment Clause to proscribe the establishment of a
national church, but believed that it disabled the federal government from interfering with
established state churches. See, e.g., STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST
FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 22-26 (1995); Kurt T. Lash, The
Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995). Philip Hamburger appears to have definitively put this view to rest.
See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 106 n.40 (2002).
6. As will be made clear in the Essay, this observation is important, but does not by itself
mean that Establishment Clause doctrine need be reworked.
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tional limitations must apply in identical ways to all levels of govern-
ment to which they are applicable? The first section of Part III shows
that this is not the case: sizing constitutional constraints to the level of
government that is acting is plausible. Several justices have embraced
sizing (though not in so many words) in the past.7 Indeed, as a matter
of blackletter law, it sometimes is the case that one level of govern-
ment is constitutionally proscribed from acting in a manner that is
permissible for another.8 For instance, Congress can enact protec-
tionist legislation whereas states may not,9 and so-called "special
governments" may disenfranchise those individuals who do not own
property whereas local and state governments cannot. 10 More gener-
ally, differential treatment of different levels of government in our
federal system is not uncommon, and is justified on such grounds as
functionalism and democratic theory. 2 This Essay argues that a
commitment to expressivism, along with an awareness of what is at
stake in struggles concerning the relationship between government
and religion, together suggest that the Establishment Clause might be
another arena where sizing is appropriate.
If sizing is an option, what determines whether it should be exer-
cised? A companion piece argues that the one-size-fits-all doctrinal
status quo is justifiable only on pragmatic grounds that support a
defeasible one-size-fits-all principle, not a categorical one-size-fits-all
requirement. 13 Building on this understanding, the second section of
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. A work-in-progress provides a comprehensive study of contemporary constitutional
doctrines that are "sized" as among the different levels of government to which they apply. See
Mark D. Rosen, The Surprisingly Strong Case for Sizing Constitutional Guarantees: A Pragmatic
Analysis 31-47 (manuscript on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review) [hereinafter Rosen,
Sizing Constitutional Guarantees].
9. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,138 (1986).
10. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355,366-67 n.ll (1981).
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF 'JUDICIAL
REVIEW 77-88 (1980) (explaining, on the basis of the theory of "representation reinforcement,"
why Congress can enact protectionist legislation but states cannot). For a complete discussion
of doctrines that are best understood as instances of sizing, see Rosen, Sizing Constitutional
Guarantees, supra note 8, at 31-89.
13. See Rosen, Sizing Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 8, at 31-47. The companion
piece also explores several potential generic costs of sizing that properly are taken account of in
determining whether, as a pragmatic matter, a constitutional provision should be sized. See id.
at 89-94. Two merit discussion here. The first is that sizing may risk undermining the national
political community. Id. at 89-91. The Rawlsian argument below provides a response with
regard to sizing the Establishment Clause: sizing Establishment Clause protections advances
rather than impedes the foundational liberal commitments that ought to shape our national
political community. See infra Part IlI.B. Second, sizing can create significant administrative
costs. See Rosen, Sizing Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 8, at 91-94. Such costs would be
2003]
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Part III argues that determining whether a constitutional doctrine
should be sized invariably turns on the political theory that is brought
to the task of constitutional interpretation. Part III then argues that
John Rawls's social contractarian approach, which is reflected in the
original position, is a fair way to identify a democratic constitutional
political order, and that the original position gives support to sizing
the Establishment Clause in narrowly circumscribed conditions.14
Rawls's approach is suited to identifying a constitutional order that
itself is democratic insofar as it asks what type of political order we as
individuals would think it fair to establish. A person in the original
position, understanding the law's expressive dimension and what is at
stake in struggles concerning the relation between government and
religion, would choose a political regime in which the federal gov-
ernment did not have the power to choose sides, but in which subfed-
eral polities could in certain situations. 5
Part IV identifies some of the implications of this Essay's analy-
sis. It explains why sizing holds out the prospect of a more neutral
Establishment Clause doctrine than does one-size-fits-all. It also
shows some practical applications of this Essay's Rawlsian analysis
with regard to several concrete Establishment Clause scenarios.
I. CULTURAL CONFLICT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE:
WHAT IS AT STAKE
It is necessary to have a basic understanding of contemporary Es-
tablishment Clause doctrine before considering the different philoso-
phical commitments held by various advocates in the debate
concerning the appropriate relations between religion and govern-
ment. Appreciating the stakeholders' different philosophical com-
only minimal under the approach outlined in this Essay, however, because only a small number
of subfederal polities, if any, would be candidates for sizing under the strict Rawlsian criteria
discussed below. See infra Part III.B.
14. See infra Part III.B.1.
15. As noted above, Rawlsian political theory justifies sizing the Establishment Clause only
under a narrow range of circumstances. Elsewhere I examine other theories that could ground a
broader justification for sizing. See generally Rosen, Sizing Constitutional Guarantees, supra
note 8 (analyzing sizing from the perspectives of law and economics, multicultural liberal
theorists Will Kymlicka and Charles Taylor, majoritarian devotee John Hart Ely, and political
philosopher Robert Nozick, among others). Some of these approaches might have application
to Establishment Clause guarantees and potentially could justify a broader range of sizing this
constitutional guarantee. The point of this short Essay is not to provide a definitive account of
what Establishment Clause doctrine should look like, but to identify a novel approach to
construing Establishment Clause guarantees and to start exploring what the consequences might
be.
[Vol 78:669
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mitments, in turn, helps explain why contemporary Establishment
Clause doctrine deviates so appreciably from the commitment to
neutrality that the doctrine identifies as its ideal. Rather, there
always are large-scale cultural winners and losers under today's law.
This is why Establishment Clause law is an arena in which opponents'
legal struggles frequently reflect, and are a part of, a deep cultural
conflict.
A. Case Law
By its terms, the Establishment Clause limits only the federal
government. 6 Prior to the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Establishment Clause and the other Bill of Rights protections
were not applicable to the states. 7 This is why it was not unconstitu-
tional during our country's first century for states to have established
churches. 8 The Supreme Court incorporated the Establishment
Clause against the states in the 1947 case of Everson v. Board of
Education.9 Since Everson, the Supreme Court has decided ap-
proximately sixty cases under the Establishment Clause. The vast
majority have been challenges to state, not federal, activities.20
Identifying the Establishment Clause's legal rules is notoriously
difficult, for the Court has utilized many different formulations.21
Nonetheless, it is fair to say that Establishment Clause doctrine does
not appear to vary depending upon which level of government-
federal, state, or local-has acted. 2
16. See U.S. CONST. amend I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion....").
17. See Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833).
18. As Daniel Conkle has noted, "[a]t the time of the first amendment's adoption... six
states... continued to maintain or authorize established religions." Daniel 0. Conkle, Toward
a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1113, 1132 (1988).
19. 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
20. In several cases, however, Establishment Clause claims have been brought against the
federal government. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (challenging federal
government funding of state and local agencies, which in turn distribute money to public and
private schools); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 607 (1988); Corp. of Presiding Bishop v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding religious exemptions in Title VII); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (addressing draft exemptions).
21. For instance, the Ninth Circuit identified, and applied, three different doctrinal tests in
the recent case of Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 292 F.3d 597, 605-07 (9th Cir. 2002).
22. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580 (1992) (noting that the Establishment Clause is a
provision that "the Fourteenth Amendment makes applicable with full force to the States and
their school districts"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) ("Government in our




What is concretely at stake in today's Establishment Clause
cases? Everson's statement that "[n]either a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church" 23 is virtually uncontested. 24 Short of
establishing a national or state church, however, what constitutes a
prohibited "establishment" is sharply disputed. One set of cases
involves the display of creches and menorahs in public spaces; such
displays frequently are permissible.25 Another series of cases con-
cerns the acceptability of teacher-led and student-led prayer in public
schools; such invocations or benedictions are largely unacceptable
under contemporary doctrine.26  A large number of decisions deal
with funding-related issues, such as public funding of religious
schools 7 and government services provided for religious institutions.2
The case law in this context is by no means settled, but the rule
appears to be that the government can aid religious schools only
insofar as it aids nonreligious institutions and only if the aid provided
is not inspired by an intent to support religion in particular. 29 Finally,
a few cases have involved delegations of government authority to
religious institutions3 and religious groups.31 Such delegations have
been uniformly struck down.
B. The Cultural Divide
Although many cases concerning the Establishment Clause could
be said to involve merely money-for example, can there be a special
23. 330 U.S. at 15.
24. I take issue with it, however, later in this Essay. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (holding
creche erected by KKK on public square adjoining state Capitol is constitutional); County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (permitting menorah and creche at entrance of city-
county building); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding city's use of a creche in
Christmas display).
26. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (striking down school
district policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer before football games); Lee, 505
U.S. at 599 (striking down benediction during graduation ceremony).
27. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 539 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding school vouchers);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (state statutes funding parochial schools found
unconstitutional).
28. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (government-financed busing of
parochial school students permissible).
29. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(upholding state university's funding of school newspaper with Christian perspective); Zobrest
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (permissible to provide translators for deaf in
parochial schools).
30. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 117 (1982).
31. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994).
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school district to which developmentally disabled children of only one
religious denomination can attend so the children can receive publicly
financed assistance without having to interact with children from
different religious backgrounds? 32-these cases also can be usefully
understood as loci for the contemporary debate with regard to the
appropriate relationship between government and religion in this
country. After all, the funding cases are decided on the basis of
constitutional principles that reflect this debate. Furthermore, most
recent cases do not involve money at all, but are best understood
primarily, if not exclusively, as concerning the debate about the
relationship between government and religion. 3 In short, the Estab-
lishment Clause cases are debated and decided in terms that reflect
the debate about the proper relationship between government and
religion-what Professor Lupu helpfully has labeled "the political and
cultural wars over the place of traditional Judeo-Christian values,
themes, prayers, and holidays in public life." 34
Arguments in support of a strong separation between religion
and the public sphere-what often is called "separationism"-
typically focus both on society-at-large and the individual. A com-
monly voiced society-wide concern advanced by separationists is that
a failure to keep the religious and political spheres apart will lead to
social strife along religious lines and a consequent fragmentation of
the American political community.35 Individual-focused concerns
animating separationism include not coercing people 36 and not
making a person's standing in the political community turn on her
religion.37
Many separationists view their position as neutral. Indeed, Es-
tablishment Clause doctrine long has identified neutrality as its
32. See id. The Court said "no."
33. This is true, for example, of the cases concerning the public display of creches and
student-led prayer in schools. Professor Lupu recently argued that the bulk of Establishment
Clause litigation today is not over funding questions, but concerns "questions of state sponsor-
ship of religious messages and themes." Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government
Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell v. Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 771, 774 (2001).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718-29 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissent-
ing).
36. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in
our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."). For a critical analysis of this aspect of Barnette, see
Steven D. Smith, Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625 (2003).
37. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ideal.3" If government does not involve itself in religion, they say, all
people will be free to practice their religion (or not to) as they please.
However, as I will suggest below-and as others have argued 39-
separationism is neutral only within a set of assumptions in respect to
human nature and religion that many people do not share. As such,
the claim that separationism is neutral is quite misleading. Under
contemporary doctrine, how the relationship between church and
state is resolved invariably generates big-time winners and losers in a
cultural contest concerning the appropriate relationship between
government and religion. (I believe that the approach I suggest in
this Essay, by contrast, is a more neutral doctrine that diminishes the
extent to which there are cultural winners and losers.)
Separationism can be said to be neutral for those who believe
that full religious practice can occur in the "private" realm.4° For such
people, the government's lack of involvement truly allows them to
fully practice their religion (in their view). However, those who
believe that a full religious life is realizable only if one's religious
activities encompass all aspects of one's life-what I will be calling an
"integrationist" approach-understandably view separationism as
nonneutral. Justice Scalia's observation in his dissent in Lee v.
Weisman41 reflects an integrationist perspective. He argued against
the notion that religion is
some purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in se-
cret ... in the privacy of one's room. For most believers it is not
that, and has never been. Religious men and women of almost all
denominations have felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech
the blessing of God as a people, and not just as individuals, because
they believe in the "protection of divine Providence," as the Decla-
ration of Independence put it, not just for individuals but for socie-
ties.42
Interestingly, under Scalia's account, public worship not only is an
aspect of the individual's practice of religion, but may be necessary
38. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) ("Government in our
democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and
practice.... The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and
religion, and between religion and nonreligion."); Andrew Koppelmann, Secular Purpose, 88
VA. L. REV. 87, 120 (2002) (noting that "[t]he idea of neutrality was introduced into Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence at the same time that the clause was held applicable to the states.");
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the 'No Endorsement' Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 313-14 (1987).
39. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 5, at 14.
40. Id.
41. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
42. Id. at 645.
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for the country's welfare as well. In short, at least as regards religion,
Scalia is arguing that there is no ready divide between public and
private.
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's claim that there is a public di-
mension to the religious practice of "most believers," his words in Lee
were penned in a dissent. It surely can be difficult for those steeped
in mainstream American society to understand why some people
maintain that the religious life cannot be confined to the "private"
domain. A recent analysis by Professor Noah Feldman of the intel-
lectual history of the Establishment Clause facilitates an understand-
ing of some of the contestable assumptions that underlie
separationsim.13  Professor Feldman argues that the founders in-
tended the Establishment Clause to protect "liberty of conscience," as
that term was developed and understood by John Locke." In the
course of his article, Feldman shows the conceptual link between
Locke's notion of liberty of conscience and Protestant theology.45
Locke based his argument for liberty of conscience in Scripture,46 and
Locke's argument, if Professor Feldman is correct, rested on the
Protestant beliefs that faith stands at the core of religiosity, that faith
cannot be dictated, and that acting against conscience itself is a sin.47
Lockean premises readily give rise to separationism.8 They lead
to the conclusion that government should not concern itself with
religious matters, for coercion (such as legal requirements) is incom-
43. See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 346 (2002). Although I am no historian, Feldman's account seems persuasive. For present
purposes, I will take it as largely correct. One question that arises under his thesis is why states
were permitted to have established churches; after all, a Lockean liberty of conscience would
appear to be equally threatened whether establishment occurred at the federal or subfederal
level. Possible responses include that the founders would not have conceived that it was
possible for the government to put such limitations on states, or that a ban on state establish-
ments simply could not have garnered sufficient support at the time of the founding. Cf.
Conkle, supra note 18, at 1133. In any event, I do not rely solely on Feldman's conclusions to
support my argument that contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine is not neutral but
instead creates large-scale winners and losers in the cultural struggle concerning the relationship
between government and religion. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
44. Feldman, supra note 43, at 350-51, 369-71.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 372.
47. Id. at 369-71.
48. For a contrary reading of Locke, see Thomas G. West, Vindicating John Locke: How a
Seventeenth-Century 'Liberal' Was Really a 'Social Conservative,' available at
http://www.frc.org/get/wt01fl.cfm (arguing that Locke believed that government properly
played a role in assuring that its citizens have proper morals).
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patible with true religion under Locke's account.4 1 Indeed, legal
obligations even can lead to sin insofar as a person might be legally
required to act against her conscience.
Religions and belief structures that view faith differently, how-
ever, may not have a Lockean conception of liberty of conscience.
Consider Judaism, for example. It is action-based rather than faith-
based insofar as actions matter more than beliefs; it frequently is said
of so-called Orthodox Judaism, for instance, that it prescribes an
ortho-praxis rather than an orthodoxy. Not unrelated to this, Judaism
has a religious concept under which it is permissible for a person to
engage in religiously prescribed activities even if she does not believe
in them at the time. It is thought that the person may, through
practice, acquire the mental state necessary to perform religious
duties to their fullest extent.5 0 In a related vein, consider Aristotle's
belief that people become habituated to act virtuously by acting
virtuously, and that they are not capable of distinguishing right from
wrong without an antecedent, behavior-generated moral structure.5
Clearly, these Jewish and Aristotelian notions are at variance with the
Protestant notion that acting against conscience is a sin. Further-
more, both Jewish and Aristotelian thought are consistent with-and
in fact have given rise to-political theories under which government
has an important role in supervising its citizens's moral develop-
ment.5 2 The logic is straightforward: if action matters most (Judaism),
49. Others similarly have argued that the constitutional protection of religion itself had a
"religious justification" for the founders. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 154-56 (1991).
50. The principle described above in text is known as mi'toch she'lo li'shma ba li'shma. See
Babylonian Talmud Tractate Pesachim 50(b) (Tel-Man Press, Vilna d. 1989) (author's
translation). For elaboration, see Tosephot d"h "vi'kahn bi'osem," as well as the Rabeiny Asher
and the Karban Natanel on the sugya.
51. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics, 1103bl-1103b5 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publishing Co. 1985) ("[W]e become just by doing just actions, temperate by doing temperate
actions, brave by doing brave actions"); see also id. at 1180a6 ("[Slomeone who is to be good
must be finely brought up and habituated, and then must live in decent practices, doing nothing
base either willingly or unwillingly"). Aristotle mentions two other ways virtue is obtained,
natural endowment and intellect. Id. at 1179b9-10, 1179b19-21. However, natural endowment
is both rare and out of an individual's control, and only a few people can be moved by intellect.
By and large, therefore, society can become virtuous only by means of government-led
habituation. See A.C. Bradley, Aristotle's Conception of the State, in A COMPANION TO
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS 28 (David Keyt & Fred D. Miller, Jr. eds., 1991).
52. See Bradley, supra note 51, at 28-29 (describing Aristotle's political theory, under
which the state is to play a role in habituating its citizens to virtue); see, e.g., HOWARD KREISEL,
MAIMONIDES' POLITICAL THOUGHT: STUDIES IN ETHIcS, LAW, AND THE HUMAN IDEAL 3-4
(1999):
Maimonides maintains ... that politics ideally consists of the following components:
knowledge of what is true happiness and what is not, the way of attaining it, training in
[Vol 78:669
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or if good action is a prerequisite to informed and meaningful choice
(Aristotle), then there is no reason to conclude that the government is
disqualified from mandating good actions. Indeed, it may be a
necessary component of a person's full ethical and spiritual develop-
ment.
Anecdotal evidence on its own demonstrates that contemporary
doctrine rests on philosophical commitments not shared by everyone
and creates cultural winners and losers.53  Consider the modern
(twentieth century) religious community known as the Rajneesh14
Members of the community apparently believed that the full practice
of their religion required that they have a city of their own-what can
be thought of as a modern day Jerusalem or Mecca-that would be
run by them in accordance with Rajneesh principles. The Rajneesh
thought that all aspects of work in their city, including its governance,
constituted a form of religious worship, and that living there afforded
its members a richer, more integrated spiritual life than was otherwise
possible.5 5 They also believed that they had to live separately from
general society to avoid being influenced by the outside world. 6 To
pursue its goals, the Rajneesh community purchased a nearly 65,000
acre parcel of undeveloped land in Oregon and incorporated about
2,000 acres of it under Oregon law. Soon thereafter, however, a
federal district court ruled that the existence of the city of Rajneesh-
the moral qualities, and finally, rules of justice for the ordering of society.... Politics
thus is ultimately concerned with the attainment of the human beings' final end ... Its
goal is the creation of a social environment most conducive to the individual's pursue
of perfection....
To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that Aristotle himself was religious, but that his un-
derstanding of personhood leads to the conclusion that the polity must be actively involved in
morally educating its citizens. The conception of personhood so clearly explicated by Aristotle
is held by many religious persons and groups, and it is easy to understand how such an
understanding gives rise to integrationist commitments. For an example of a contemporary
religious neo-Aristotelian philosopher who advances the view that a "unified" life requires that
government actively seek to inculcate virtues in its citizens, see Alasdair Maclntyre, The Virtues,
the Unity of a Human Life and the Concept of a Tradition, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 125,
141-44 (Michael Sandel ed., 1984). Aristotelian views concerning human nature and politics
also were absorbed by classical Jewish and Islamic thinkers. See KREISEL, supra, at 3-5 (noting
that both Maimonides and Alfarabi developed political theories that are properly characterized
as part of the "Aristotelian tradition").
53. The argument developed here accordingly does not turn on the soundness of Professor
Feldman's analysis.
54. What follows draws from Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-
Governance in Residential Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory,
84 VA. L. REV. 1053 (1998) [hereinafter Rosen, Outer Limits].
55. Id. at 1082-84.
56. Id. at 1083.
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puram violated the Establishment Clause. 57 The principle of strict
separation that led to the city's demise, far from being neutral,
interfered with the Rajneeshee's ability to live their lives in the
manner they believed their religion dictated. It interfered with their
chance to live out what they deemed to be the most fulfilling religious
life. I will come back to the Rajneeshpuram case later in the Essay.58
To quickly conclude, there is no neutrality with respect to the re-
lationship between government and religion under contemporary
Establishment Clause doctrine. 9 Scalia, Judaism, neo-Aristotelians, 6°
and the Rajneesh are examples of cultural losers under a regime of
strict separation. Indeed, the Establishment Clause's antiestablish-
ment principle, if Feldman is correct, paradoxically rests on Christian
theological premises that are not shared by all. In that sense, the First
Amendment's ban on establishment itself may even be said to consti-
tute an establishment of certain Protestant principles. Not surpris-
ingly, some people of different backgrounds do not agree with these
principles or their separationist implications. In the view of these
groups, strict separation interferes with their adherents' religious
worship and with society's well-being. In short, the appropriate
relationship between religion and government is hotly contested
because advocates on both sides of the issue believe so much is at
stake. The cases are battles in a classic cultural war for the identity
and welfare of individuals and society at large.
II. EXPRESSIVISM
The conflict between the various camps in Establishment Clause
struggles can be usefully understood in expressivist terms. To see this
first requires an understanding of what is meant by an "expressive"
theory of law. Understanding the cultural conflict in expressivist
terms suggests that such conflict may have doctrinal consequences.
57. See Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208, 1216-17 (D. Or. 1984);
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1084 (discussing at greater length the legal proceedings
and ultimate disposition).
58. See infra at pp. 706, 709.
59. For another critique of the notion of neutrality in the Establishment Clause context,
see Smith, supra note 38, at 320-31. For a discussion of how this Essay's suggestion would
square with Professor Smith's critique of the possibility of neutrality, see infra Part IV.B.
60. See supra note 52.
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A. What It Is
It is important from the outset to note that although expressivism
has been embraced by many commentators61 and some judges,62 it is a
controversial approach to law that has been sharply criticized by
others.63 I cannot hope to defend expressivism's merits in the course
of this short Essay. This piece instead works within an expressivist
framework without explicitly defending it. Even so, this Essay may
help to illuminate expressivism's desirability insofar as understanding
a theory's concrete implications is necessary to inductively evaluate
the theory.
Expressivism refers to a family of legal theories that are attentive
to the fact that laws frequently express messages that are generally
understood by citizens. This is not to suggest that a law only has
expressive significance, but that understanding a law's social meaning
is necessary to fully understand the law. 64 Indeed, expressivists argue
that awareness of law's social meaning frequently helps to make sense
of doctrinal distinctions that otherwise can be difficult to under-
stand.65 To be sure, expressivists do not claim that their approach is
fully applicable to all parts of the law, but think that the significance
of the expressive dimension varies from one body of doctrine to
another. It follows that attaining a full awareness of the law's social
meaning, and hence its expressive outcomes, may have prescriptive
consequences for a body of law that has significant expressive effects.
This brings us to the Establishment Clause, for several members of
the Supreme Court66 and numerous commentators67 have argued that
the Establishment Clause is best understood as being importantly,
and perhaps primarily, concerned with expressivism.
61. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Judging by Appearances: Professional Ethics, Expressive
Government, and the Moral Significance of How Things Seem, 60 MD. L. REV. 653 (2001);
Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1 (2000).
62. The most notable proponent of this approach has been Justice O'Connor. See supra
Part I.B.
63. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3 (providing a rigorous critique of one variant of expressiv-
ism).
64. See Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1530-31 (2000).
65. See, e.g., id. at 1551-52, 1558.
66. See infra Part ll.B.
67. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 64, at 1545-51; David Cole, Faith and Funding:
Toward an Expressivist Model of the Establishment Clause, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 559 (2002).
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Expressivism is a relative newcomer to American jurispru-
dence, 68 and several variants of expressivism can be found in the legal
literature. Most are not rigorously formulated, but instead are
grounded largely on intuition and are regrettably silent in respect of
salient matters. One notable exception is a recent work by Elizabeth
Anderson and Richard Pildes entitled Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement.69 It is a full-blown, sophisticated exposition of
many of the fundaments of any expressivist account of law. Its
carefully worded title-Expressive Theories of Law-suggests its
authors' recognition that there are numerous variants of expressivism.
Anderson and Pildes's rich account, however, can easily be misunder-
stood as a comprehensive discussion of all these many variants. It is
important to bear in mind that it is not. Rather, after answering
philosophical challenges that are applicable to a broad range (if not
the entire range) of expressivist theories,70 Anderson and Pildes
articulate and defend their particular expressivist theory.71 What
follows accordingly draws heavily on Anderson and Pildes's theoreti-
cal defense of expressivism generally, but is not limited to the variant
of expressivism that they embrace.
As mentioned above, what all expressivist theories share is the
observation that laws frequently express certain attitudes, values, or
beliefs. Anderson and Pildes persuasively argue that it is sensible to
speak of expression as such, despite the fact that law is created by a
collective agency (such as a legislature) rather than an individual.7 2
Anderson and Pildes also convincingly contend that a law can express
a particular meaning irrespective of whatever may have been the
actual intent of those who enacted it.73 The justification for both of
these arguably counterintuitive claims is that the relevant social
meaning for expressivist purposes is the meaning that citizens attrib-
ute to the law.74 Social meaning accordingly is an empirical phe-
nomenon. Furthermore, it is a function of contemporary
68. To be sure, some earlier scholarship anticipated themes that today's expressivists have
developed. See Adler, supra note 3, at 1369. This is not surprising, for there is little that is
wholly new under the sun.
69. See Anderson & Pildes, supra note 64.
70. See id. at 1506-27.
71. See id. at 1527-75.
72. See id. at 1514-27.
73. See id. at 1525.
74. See id. at 1520-27. Anderson and Pildes offer an additional reason as to why the first
challenge to expressivism fails when they argue that it is sensible to ascribe mental states to
collectives. See id. at 1514-20.
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understandings and sensibilities. In other words, social meanings are
"socially constructed. These meanings are a result of the ways in
which actions fit with (or fail to fit with) other meaningful norms and
practices in the community.""7 Because expressivist theories focus on
law's meaning for citizens, it does not matter that law is created by a
multimember body. It similarly does not matter what indeed was in
the mind of those who enacted a particular law. 76
The variants of expressivism focus on different possible conse-
quences of the fact that law expresses attitudes, values, and beliefs.
Anderson and Pildes are concerned with what they call "expressive
harms. 7 7 Expressive harms refer to the expression of "impermissible
attitudes toward persons, such as hostility or contempt for racial or
ethnic groups. ' 78 Robert Cooter and Cass Sunstein, by contrast, are
concerned with the ways in which law socializes citizens as it ex-
presses particular attitudes, values, or beliefs.79 Cooter, for example,
speaks of two expressive uses of law, one of which is "[c]hanging
individual values. '80 Similarly, Cass Sunstein argues that law inevita-
bly and properly is involved in "norm management," and in "express-
75. Id. at 1525.
76. Interestingly, Anderson and Pildes go even further and argue that group expression
does not depend on there being a meaning of which the group is conscious:
The expressive meaning of a particular act or practice, then, need not be in the
agent's head, the recipient's head, or even in the heads of the general public. Ex-
pressive meanings are socially constructed. These meanings are a result of the ways
in which actions fit with (or fail to fit with) other meaningful norms and practices in
the community. Although these meanings do not actually have to be recognized by
the community, they have to be recognizable by it, if people were to exercise enough
interpretive self-scrutiny.
Id. The expressive analysis I undertake later in the Essay is of this sort; I seek to identify a
social meaning of Establishment Clause doctrine that is undeniable, though not widely
recognized.
77. Id. at 1527.
78. Id. at 1521.
79. Anderson and Pildes attempt to disassociate expressivism from such "direct cultural
effects." Id. at 1560 (arguing that "[elxpressive interpretations are concerned with the
expressive character of laws, not with the direct cultural effects of decisions, with how some
segment of the public reacts to a decision, or with extremely speculative parades of horribles.").
The effort to distinguish cultural effects from a law's expressive character appears to be driven
by concerns that courts are not competent to make such "speculative" judgments. Id.
80. Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 586 (1998).
The other expressive function Cooter mentions is "[c]reating focal points" that lead to a new
equilibrium for a given system of social norms. Id. By this, Cooter means law's ability to switch
behavior without altering the individual's tastes. Id. at 595. Examples include prohibiting
smoking in airports and requiring dog owners to clean up after their pets. Id. It is likely that
altering behavior in this way ultimately leads to a change in societal values, as well.
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ing social values" and "social norms" that shape and constitute the
political community.81
B. Expressivism's Relevance to the Establishment Clause
1. The Endorsement Test
As several scholars have noted, 2 Justice O'Connor introduced an
approach to the Establishment Clause, known as the endorsement
test, which is accurately described as being expressivist in character.
In a concurring opinion in the case of Lynch v. Donnelly,s3 Justice
O'Connor wrote that the Establishment Clause prevents
government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement
sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full
members of the political community, and an accompanying mes-
sage to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community. 84
Justice O'Connor's focus on the "message" that is sent by govern-
ment endorsement of religion is what makes her concurrence expres-
sivist.85 Her concern that nonadherents not be made to feel as
"outsiders"-an obvious harm-puts O'Connor's approach into the
Anderson and Pildes variant of expressivism. The linkage between
the Establishment Clause and expressivism is not limited to Lynch or
to Justice O'Connor. Professor Matthew Adler correctly notes that
"[s]ince Lynch, the Court has repeatedly incorporated an endorse-
ment analysis into its Establishment Clause decisions; and all nine
sitting justices are now on record as favoring some such analysis." 86
Widespread adoption of aspects of the endorsement test can be
understood as doctrinal recognition of expressivism's relevance to the
Establishment Clause.
Although the endorsement test generally has been well received
in the academic community, 87 it also has been the subject of some
81. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907, 910
(1996); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021
(1996) (examining how law effectuates changes in social norms).
82. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 3, at 1372; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 64, at 1547.
83. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
84. Id. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
85. For a fuller discussion as to why O'Connor's concurrence properly qualifies as
expressivist, see Anderson & Pildes, supra note 64, at 1546-51.
86. Adler, supra note 3, at 1372 (citations omitted).
87. For an extensive list of academic commentary supportive of the no endorsement test,
see Smith, supra note 38, at 274 n.45.
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heavy criticism. The two most sustained critiques have been penned
by Professor Michael McConnell and Professor Steven Smith.88
McConnell's arguments are a critique of the endorsement test, but
not of expressivism generally; as I will show later, his arguments have
no application to the expressivist approach that this Essay advo-
cates.89 Because this Essay takes no position on the wisdom of the
particular approach to expressivism that is found in the endorsement
test, it accordingly will not address Professor McConnell's substantive
points. One of Professor Smith's arguments, by contrast, poses a
challenge to the logic that undergirds any expressivist theory of law.
For this reason, it is necessary to fully consider Professor Smith's
position.
In the course of his article, Professor Smith critiques the en-
dorsement test by asking whether laws excluding clergy from office
express a disrespect for clergy (by implying, for instance, that they are
not sufficiently capable), express respect for clergy (by implying, for
example, that they are too special to be sullied by politics), or do
neither (by simply reflecting the view that separation between church
and state is best).9° The crux of Professor Smith's argument is that a
given governmental act may have multiple, mutually exclusive
meanings. Although Smith's point was directed to the endorsement
test, it applies to all expressivist theories insofar as they presume that
a government action has a particular social meaning. After all, if a
governmental action can be understood to mean both "x" and "not-
x," then it might be difficult to understand what type of expressive
consequence possibly can flow from it.
While Smith's argument suggests that the endorsement test
might be unworkable in certain contexts, it is not devastating to the
endorsement test in particular or to expressivism more generally. To
begin, it is possible that legal doctrine sometimes (at least) expresses
a clear message. For instance, as I will soon suggest,91 it is plausible to
conclude that today's Establishment Clause doctrine communicates at
least one thing very clearly: that the intermingling of political and
religious authority is categorically bad. This is not to suggest that the
88. See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at the Crossroads, 59 U. CHi. L. REV.
115, 147-57 (1992); Smith, supra note 38, at 306-07.
89. See infra note 104.
90. See Smith, supra note 38, at 306-07; see also id. at 322-23. It should be noted that the
bulk of Smith's argument, like McConnell's, is applicable to the endorsement test in particular
and has no general relevance to expressive theories of law. See, e.g., id. at 276-309, 313-31.
91. See infra pp. 687-89.
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doctrine has any particular meaning as an a priori matter. Indeed,
whether legal doctrine does or does not communicate a singular, clear
message would appear to be an empirical fact that turns on a whole
network of contingent contemporary social understandings; in the
words of Anderson & Pildes, it is "socially constructed. '92 The point
is that sometimes doctrine may express a readily cognizable message.
Smith does not argue against this possibility, and his point accordingly
is not an across-the-board critique of the endorsement test or expres-
sivism more generally.
Moreover, even where a governmental action is capable of gen-
erating multiple meanings, it is not self-evident that this renders
expressivism irrelevant. Imagine a circumstance where a governmen-
tal action had a pernicious meaning of "x" to members of Group A,
but had a benign meaning of "y" to all other members of society.93 Is
it inappropriate as a per se matter to say that the governmental action
creates an expressive harm to members of Group A just because the
action has more than one possible social meaning? I do not see why
this should be so. After all, outside the context of expressivism, it is
not generally the case that the law is calibrated to the least sensitive
members of society. In short, more is necessary to undermine the
logic of expressivism than Professor Smith's observation that a
governmental action may have multiple meanings.
2. Expressivism and Cultural Conflict
The costs endured by contemporary losers in Establishment
Clause litigation discussed above 94 can usefully be described in
expressivist terms. I wish to make clear from the outset that what
follows does not purport to be an argument based on current doc-
trine. Neither the Court nor commentators have analyzed the effects
of Establishment Clause doctrine in the particular expressivist terms
soon to be discussed. 9 What follows accordingly is a self-conscious
call for doctrinal change. On the other hand, this doctrinal change
may be partly grounded in contemporary doctrine. It could be argued
that insofar as the Court has adopted an expressivist approach to the
Establishment Clause through the endorsement test, it has opened
92. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 64, at 1525.
93. It is worth noting that the phenomenon posited above is not counterfactual. One of the
characteristics of social groups is that their members tend to see things similarly.
94. See supra Part I.B.
95. See supra note 68.
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the door for the adoption of other expressivist approaches in the
Establishment Clause context. If so, the analysis that follows merely
ventures through that door.
The injured stakeholders under contemporary Establishment
Clause doctrine for the most part have been96 "integrationists" - those
like Justice Scalia, the Rajneesh, and neo-Aristotelians who believe
that contemporary doctrine literally interferes with their ability to live
life fully in accordance with their views of what religion requires.
Preventing such persons from freely living out their lives is the most
blunt method of altering social norms in a Cooterian and Sunsteinian
sense, for the law puts such groups at risk and, accordingly, actually
works towards the creation of a society where there simply are not
any persons who hold such views. This is one possible consequence
of contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine that can be under-
stood in expressivist terms.
To more fully understand the expressivist effects of today's Es-
tablishment Clause doctrine, consider the law's "social meaning."
Even if it is true that doctrine frequently (or even usually) can be said
to express many different things,97 today's Establishment Clause
doctrine communicates at least one thing very clearly: the intermin-
gling of political and religious authority is categorically bad. To
understand the social meaning of contemporary doctrine clearly,
consider the following. For the first one hundred-plus years of this
country's existence-before the incorporation of the Establishment
Clause against the states-the Clause barred the establishment of a
national church, but did not proscribe state and local governments
from intermixing politics and religion. And the subfederal American
polities did intermix politics and religion: there were established
churches in six states,98 state and local governments paid salaries for
clergy, and so forth.99 Today, by contrast, all levels of government' °°
96. To be sure, integrationists have not lost all recent struggles, and it might even be said
that of late they have been winning more frequently than they have lost. See, e.g., Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding school voucher program); Rosenberger v.
Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (upholding state university's
funding of school newspaper with Christian perspective). Even if this is the case, this only
would mean that there is a different set of cultural winners under contemporary doctrine. This
would not undermine this Essay's project, which is to develop a doctrine that reduces the extent
of absolute winners and losers under the Establishment Clause, and that accordingly is more
neutral in effect.
97. See supra Part II.B.1.
98. See Conkle, supra note 18, at 1132.
99. For more on church-state relations at the subfederal levels prior to incorporation, see
HAMBURGER, supra note 5.
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are disallowed from establishing religion, and the same constraints to
which the federal government is subject apply in equal force to
subfederal polities.1°1
Now consider the changing social meaning of Establishment
Clause doctrine through history. Before incorporation, the Constitu-
tion could well have been understood to express the view that it
would be problematic to establish a national church. It is far harder
to say that the Establishment Clause's generally understood meaning
was that the intermingling of religion and politics was categorically
bad, given the twin facts that (1) absent from the list of limitations
that the Constitution imposed on states was any establishment
constraint and that (2) there indeed were established churches in
many states at the time. By contrast, today's doctrine, under which
the Clause applies equally to all levels of American government,
could readily be understood to express the view that the intermingling
of religious and political authority is unqualifiedly bad-that it is
categorically un-American, categorically counter to American
constitutionalism. In short, the social meaning of Establishment
Clause doctrine is a function of what level of government the doctrine
applies to.
Although it is conceivable that contemporary Establishment
Clause doctrine could have been differently understood by the
American public, I suggest that, in fact, it is not. Though I cannot
definitively establish this empirical fact here, I imagine that most
would agree that American citizens generally understand the Estab-
lishment Clause as communicating categorical opposition to the
intermixing of governmental and religious authority. Indeed, judging
by the reflexively critical approach most Americans take to such
intermixings in other countries, Americans seem to believe that
categorical opposition to the intermingling of the realms of religion
and politics is a mandate of modern political theory more generally -
100. The sole exception is tribal governments, which are not bound by the United States
Constitution. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896). So, for example, in the Hopi tribe
"religion and village organization... is virtually inseparable [and m]embership in a village is in
part religious as well as civil." Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-
Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L.
REv. 479, 551-52 (2000) (quoting Kavena v. Hopi Indian Tribal Court, 16 Indian L. Rep. 6063,
6065 (Hopi Tribal App. Ct. 1989)).
101. See supra Part I.A.
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typically liberal political theory-and is not merely a parochial
American constitutional requirement. 02
Assuming this description of the contemporary social meaning of
Establishment Clause doctrine (and liberal political theory) to be
correct, it follows that such a monolithically uniform message from
the government itself is likely to have Cooterian and Sunsteinian
socializing effects on the integrationists, apart from the aforemen-
tioned fact that the law keeps integrationists from doing as they wish.
Moreover, if the social meaning of the Establishment Clause pointed
out above is correct, then Establishment Clause doctrine also creates
expressive harms of the Anderson and Pildes variety for stalwart
integrationists. The law's categorical rejection of the intermixing of
governmental and religious authority constitutes an expressive harm
insofar as it expresses utter contempt for the way of life integration-
ists feel so dear, suggesting (and indeed sometimes explicitly stating)
that the form of life they seek is wholly incompatible with American
and liberal values.
III. SIZING: ITS POSSIBILITY AND DESIRABILITY
Assume as correct the social meaning of contemporary Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine described above. Is such a social meaning
problematic? This Part refutes two plausible claims that it is not, and
suggests that such a social meaning indeed is problematic under
widely held liberal premises.
First, it might be argued that contemporary Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, and its consequent social meaning, are un-
avoidable consequences in a post-Fourteenth Amendment world in
which the Establishment Clause has real teeth in respect of the
federal government. If the Establishment Clause is to place signifi-
cant limitations on the federal government, the argument goes, then it
inevitably must do the same in respect of subfederal polities. Al-
though this view typically is not explicitly made today,10 3 it is a fre-
102. Part III.B infra critiques the view that liberalism is categorically opposed to the
intermingling of religious and political authority.
103. Some thoughtful commentators have put forward this view. See, e.g., Amy Gutmann,
Religion and State in the United States, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF
FAITH: RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION IN PLURALIST DEMOCRACIES 127 (Nancy L. Rosen-
blum ed., 2000) ("Dissenting citizens at the local level might look to public authorities at
another level to regulate and restrain their local religious-political officials. But why would a
weak Establishment Clause jurisprudence that permitted church-state entanglement at one level
not also permit it at another?"); cf ERWIN CREMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
2003]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
quently unstated article of faith for many, if not most, scholars and
practitioners of constitutional law. In response, subpart A introduces
the doctrinal option that I dub sizing. That is to say, what the Consti-
tution proscribes, permits, or mandates could vary across different
levels of government. It simply is not inconceivable that the Constitu-
tion could permit a local government to do something that the federal
government is constitutionally disabled from doing.
The second plausible claim as to why the above-discussed social
meaning of the Establishment Clause is not problematic is that the
intermixing of religious and political authority in fact is normatively
undesirable as a categorical matter. Communicating such a message,
on this view, accordingly is not problematic. Quite the opposite: it is
beneficial! Stated differently, this second claim is that even if it is
true that sizing is possible, it is undesirable. Subpart B answers this
challenge. It explains why intermixing religious and political author-
ity is not per se unacceptable under standard liberal premises. To the
contrary, it is intermixing's categorical preclusion that is problematic.
A government structure that permits the intermixing of religious and
political authority in select subfederal polities, subject to some
important caveats, is the best way to realize foundational liberal
commitments. And that provides a predicate for concluding that
sizing may be normatively desirable.
A. Sizing Identified
Individual justices on the Supreme Court (though never a major-
ity) long have advocated the position that the Constitution's con-
straints sometimes might apply to the states differently than they
apply to the federal government. This is the concept that I denomi-
nate "sizing." I hope to suggest here that sizing is a doctrinal tech-
nique that takes advantage of a potential for political diversity that is
inherent in America's federal system, and that this potential can be
called upon to neutralize some of the expressive consequences of
contemporary doctrine. 1°4
AND POLICIES 486 (2d ed. 2002) (arguing that "rights such as freedom of speech are fundamen-
tal liberties, and there is no reason why their content should vary depending on the level of
government").
104. Sizing accordingly is not vulnerable to McConnell's critiques. McConnell argues that
the endorsement test is unworkable because there can be no neutral baseline from which to
judge whether a governmental act endorses or disapproves of religion, see McConnell, supra
note 88, at 148-49; that the endorsement test is biased against religion because virtually no
governmental action "disapproves" of religion, but instead can be said to be driven by a secular
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Let our brief tour of sizing'05 start with the 1925 case of Gitlow v.
New York,' ° which concerned a First Amendment challenge to a New
York statute that criminalized the advocacy of anarchy. In dissent,
Justice Holmes wrote as follows:
The general prii:ciple of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken
to be included sit the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope
that has been given to the word 'liberty' as there used, although
perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of inter-
pretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that
governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States. °7
In classic, epigrammatic Holmesian fashion, this was all the great
Justice had to say about the matter. These words suggest that Justice
Holmes was advancing a text-based argument that the constitutional
constraints differ as between the federal and state governments
because each is governed by different constitutional language.108
The next important discussion of sizing appears in yet another
dissent, that of Justice Jackson in Beauharnais v. Illinois,10° which
purpose, id. at 152; and that the test is biased among religions insofar as messages affirming
mainstream religions "are likely to be familiar and to seem inconsequential." Id. at 154. None
of these critiques has application to a sizing that was prompted by sensitivity to expressivist
concerns. This definitively shows that McConnell's arguments do not undermine expressivism
generally, but instead are a critique of one particular expressivist doctrine, the endorsement test.
105. I currently am at work on a more comprehensive analysis of sizing that, among other
things, explores aspects of contemporary constitutional doctrine-not merely the thoughts of a
handful of Supreme Court Justices-that can be understood as reflecting sizing. See Rosen,
Sizing Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 8, at 31-47. None of these other doctrines concern
the Establishment Clause, however, and I accordingly will not discuss them here.
106. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
107. Id. at 672 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
108. Justice Holmes and the other justices surveyed below all rejected incorporation of the
Bill of Rights, concluding that the limitations to which states are subject are provided by the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. This position, of course, has been flatly rejected
by the Court. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648 (2002) ("[tlhe Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment, applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment
.. ") (emphasis added). As I will show in a future piece, however, sizing is not dependent on
rejecting incorporation, but is fully consistent with selective incorporation. See Rosen, Sizing
Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 8, at 11-21. Indeed, several justices who have embraced
selective incorporation also have advocated what this Essay dubs sizing. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz,
437 U.S. 28, 52-53 (1978) (Powell, J., dissenting). This Essay examines Justices Holmes's,
Harlan's, and Jackson's understanding of sizing because theirs are the most articulate discus-
sions of sizing that are found in the judicial corpus. As such, they clearly illustrate the doctrinal
option of sizing. Moreover, most of their analysis seamlessly transfers to the selective
incorporation context. See Rosen, Sizing Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 8.
On another note, it is interesting to observe that although Justice Holmes's analysis stated
that (what I call) sizing should result in greater "latitude" for the States, the majority of justices
in Gitlow, who did not engage in sizing, upheld a state statute that Holmes's dissent would have
struck down. There is no logical inconsistency here, of course: the majority's free speech test
was less strict than either the federal or state free speech test that Holmes advocated.
109. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
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famously upheld a state's group libel statute. Among other argu-
ments, 110 Justice Jackson articulated what might be called a function-
alist explanation in support of sizing:
The inappropriateness of a single standard for restricting State and
Nation is indicated by the disparity between their functions and du-
ties in relation to those freedoms. Criminality of defamation is
predicated upon power either to protect the private right to enjoy
integrity of reputation or the public right to tranquility. Neither of
these are objects of federal cognizance except when necessary to
the accomplishment of some delegated power.... When the Fed-
eral Government puts liberty of press in one scale, it has a very lim-
ited duty to personal reputation or local tranquility to weigh against
it in the other. But state action affecting speech or press can and
should be weighed against and reconciled with these conflicting so-
cial interests.
For these reasons I should not, unless clearly required, confirm to
the Federal Government such latitude as I think a State reasonably
may require for orderly government of its manifold concerns. The
converse of the proposition is that I would not limit the power of the
State with the severity appropriately prescribed for federal power.'
Justice Harlan was the next member of the Court to embrace siz-
ing. In a series of dissenting opinions, Justice Harlan developed the
most sophisticated arguments to date in support of sizing. In his
dissent in Roth v. United States, Justice Harlan adopted Justice
Jackson's functional analysis from Beauharnais."2 Justice Harlan's
approach was not markedly different from Justice Jackson's, though
his explanation is even more straightforwardly of the sizing variety:
The Constitution differentiates between those areas of human con-
duct subject to the regulation of the States and those subject to the
powers of the Federal Government. The substantive powers of the
two governments, in many instances, are distinct. And in every
case where we are called upon to balance the interest in free ex-
pression against other interests, it seems important that we should
keep in the forefront the question of whether those interests are
state or federal. Since under our constitutional scheme the two are
not necessarily equivalent, the balancing process must needs often
produce different results. Whether a particular limitation on speech
or press is to be upheld because it subserves a paramount govern-
mental interest must, to a large extent, I think, depend on whether
that government has, under the Constitution, a direct substantive in-
terest, that is, the power to act, in the particular area involved.1 3
110. See id. at 291-94 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 294-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
112. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 505 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added).
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Throughout many opinions in which he advocated the sizing of
constitutional limitations, Justice Harlan articulated two additional
justifications. 114 First, in the spirit of Justice Brandeis's New State Ice
dissent,"5 Justice Harlan praised the fact that each state is an inde-
pendent "experimental social laborator[y]" that can experiment with
"novel techniques of social control."' 1 6 Harlan thought that there was
an "immense advantage" to having "separate centers for such
experimentation," and argued that there was "no overwhelming
danger to our freedom to experiment" so long as there was "no
uniform nation-wide suppression of," (for instance) a particular
book.",7 Justice Harlan argued that the possibility of experimentation,
in the absence of severe risk due to the fact that other states can be
expected to legislate differently, was a reason to treat state legislation
differently than federal legislation for purposes of constitutional
analysis." 8
Second, and conversely, Justice Harlan argued that there are far
greater "dangers to free thought and expression... if the Federal
Government imposes a blanket ban over the Nation on such a book"
than if a state does insofar as a federal ban forecloses the possibility
that some people in the United States will be allowed to read a
particular book."9 Similarly, a federal ban destroys "[t]he prerogative
of the States to differ on their ideas of morality. ' 120 The greater
dangers inherent in federal regulation accordingly justify a constitu-
tional regime under which the federal government would be subject
to more stringent constitutional limitations than states such that states
may be permitted to ban materials that the federal government could
not.
These justifications for sizing carry over fully to the Establish-
ment Clause. Indeed, in a concurring opinion in Walz v. Tax Com-
mission' 2' Justice Harlan explicitly suggested that Establishment
114. For a sample of Justice Harlan's sizing opinions in the criminal context, see Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
615 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring); and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
116. Roth, 354 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 505-06 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
120. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
121. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
20031
CHICA GO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Clause protections may be scaled on the basis of which level of
government was operating, writing that "[i]t may also be that the
States, while bound to observe strict neutrality, should be freer to
experiment with involvement [in religion] - on a neutral basis-than
the Federal Government.' ' 2 In the recent case of Zelman v. Sim-
mons-Harris,123 Justice Thomas made the same point in a concurring
opinion, writing that "in the context of the Establishment Clause, it
may well be that state action should be evaluated on different terms
than similar action by the Federal Government." 124
Justice Thomas's concurrence in Zelman is the last locus of dis-
cussion concerning sizing that this Essay will examine. 12 Justice
Thomas did not elaborate any additional justifications for sizing-he
focused, as did Justice Harlan, on the benefit of allowing states to
experiment. 26 Justice Thomas did, however, provide a novel sugges-
tion as to what limitations should apply to states:
Thus, while the Federal Government may "make no law respecting
an establishment of religion," the States may pass laws that include
or touch on religious matters so long as these laws do not impede
free exercise rights or any other individual religious liberty inter-
est.12
7
Of course, the requirement that state law not impede free exercise
rights does not amount to much of a limitation under the contempo-
rary free exercise doctrine that has been created by Employment
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith28 and
its progeny.129 Justice Thomas's words that state law cannot impede
"any other individual religious liberty interest" presumably are
intended to afford additional protections beyond those of Smith,
though he has not explained what they might be. Below I suggest
different constraints to which states properly are subject under the
Fourteenth Amendment. They go beyond what likely would be
122. Id. at 699 (Harlan, J., concurring).
123. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
124. Id. at 678 (Thomas, J., concurring).
125. A full explanation of sizing must await another day. See Rosen, Sizing Constitutional
Guarantees, supra note 8.
126. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 679-84 (Thomas, J., concurring).
127. Id. at 679 (Thomas, J., concurring).
128. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
129. Under this line of case law, government action interfering with a person's ability to
freely exercise her religion generally is permissible-it is subject to only a rational basis test-as
long as the governmental action is neutral and generally applicable. Strict scrutiny applies only
if the government has acted in a nonneutral, nongeneral manner. Id. at 878-84.
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included in even a generous interpretation of Justice Thomas's
formulation.
B. Sizing's Desirability
The discussion above definitively shows that it is not inevitable,
as an a priori matter, that the constitutional limitations that apply to
one level of government must apply to other levels of government in
the same way. Though sizing has never commanded a majority of the
Supreme Court, it is not inconceivable. Indeed, over the past seventy-
five years or so, assorted justices have advocated what I have called
sizing.
The question remains, of course, as to whether sizing is norma-
tively desirable; just because something is possible does not preclude
its being repugnant. Answering this question requires recourse to
some normative framework. For present purposes I will assume,
without proving, that constitutional interpretation inevitably involves
reliance on some contestable political theory. Frequently the theory
is unstated. I take it to be self-evident that it is better to explicitly
identify the theory one utilizes, particularly where the theory is
outcome-determinative. What follows is a normative argument,
based on liberal political theory, that suggests the desirability of sizing
in certain very narrow circumstances. The types of expressive conse-
quences identified earlier in this Essay are a crucial part of this
political analysis. Although it is possible that the circumstances
justifying sizing do not today pertain within the United States, the
analysis importantly shows that liberal political theory does not
categorically require strict separation between religious and political
authorities. Awareness of the doctrinal option of sizing is significant
insofar as sizing can operationalize this conclusion of liberal political
theory.
In addition to providing a theoretical justification for sizing, the
discussion below also identifies the type of constraints to which states
and other subfederal polities should be subject. The framework that
follows accordingly provides the building blocks for understanding
what types of Establishment Clause limitations properly apply to
subfederal governments under the Fourteenth Amendment. These
limitations go beyond what Justice Thomas alluded to in his Zelman
concurrence.
In two earlier articles, I relied on the liberal political theories de-
veloped by John Rawls and Will Kymlicka to argue that foundational
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liberal commitments require that liberal polities permit certain
"illiberal groups" and "political perfectionists" to flourish, subject to
some important but relatively modest constraints. 10 Illiberal groups
and political perfectionists, as I understand and have formally defined
them,' both require the ability to exercise political power over their
members that current constitutional doctrine is widely believed to
proscribe. 132 Though not a null set,'33 this is a very small category, for
many groups can flourish without exercising political power.TM Some
integrationists, but most likely not all, would qualify as political
perfectionists or illiberal groups. 135 My analysis suggests that standard
liberal premises give rise to the conclusion that many (though not all)
illiberal groups and political perfectionists should be allowed to
exercise the type of political power that they believe is necessary for
their survival, subject to certain limitations. To date, however, I have
not elaborated precisely what governmental powers these groups
should be permitted to exercise. This Essay examines the govern-
mental powers in relation to religion that political perfectionists
should be permitted to exercise, focusing only on the thought of John
Rawls (due to considerations of length)136 After sketching the
130. I have developed these arguments in Outer Limits, supra note 54, and Mark D. Rosen,
"Illiberal" Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American Constitutionalism, 12 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 803 (2002) [hereinafter Rosen, Illiberal Societal Cultures]. Outer Limits was
primarily an argument based on a reworking of JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993).
Illiberal Societal Cultures provided a syncretic reading of POLITICAL LIBERALISM and WILL
KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP (1995).
131. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1064-71 (defining "political perfectionists");
Rosen, Illiberal Societal Cultures, supra note 130, at 804, 810-11 (defining "illiberal societal
cultures").
132. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1064-71 (defining "political perfectionists");
Rosen, Illiberal Societal Cultures, supra note 130, at 804, 810-11 (defining "illiberal societal
cultures").
133. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1071-87.
134. For a discussion of the practical differences as regards self-governance between
"public" ordering and "private" ordering through contract and voluntary associations, and an
explanation as to why private ordering is inadequate for some groups, see Mark D. Rosen, The
Radical Possibility of Limited Community-Based Interpretation of the Constitution, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 927, 930-32 (2002) [hereinafter Rosen, Community-Based Interpretation].
135. Only those integrationist groups that believed that the exercise of political power was
necessary for their members' complete self-actualization as human beings would qualify as
political perfectionists for purposes of this Rawlsian analysis. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra
note 54, at 1064-71. Determining whether a particular integrationist group qualifies as a
political perfectionist thus is highly context specific, and this Essay accordingly will not seek to
identify which if any of today's integrationist groups would so qualify.
136. For an explanation as to why political theory, and John Rawls's thought in particular, is
highly relevant to constitutional interpretation, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1061-
62; see also infra at p. 697. I explore other plausible justifications for sizing constitutional
guarantees in a companion piece. See Rosen, Sizing Constitutional Guarantees, supra note 8.
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framework developed in my earlier pieces, I will show that political
perfectionists should be allowed to exercise powers that would be
foreclosed under contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine but
that could be accommodated under sizing.137
1. Rawls's Original Position
John Rawls's project in Political Liberalism is to describe the ba-
sic structure of a stable and enduring democratic constitutional
regime that can win the wholehearted support of a citizenry having a
plurality of irreconcilable "comprehensive doctrines.' ' 1 8 Rawls is a
social contractarian, 13 9 aiming to identify the powers that persons
willingly would cede to a government of their creation. Such an
approach seems well suited to identifying the institutional (constitu-
tional) characteristics of a democratic constitutional regime insofar as
democratic authority requires, at least, that the government structure
be one to which citizens hypothetically could be said to have con-
sented.140
Rawls's foundational premise is that the fairest way to define
governmental powers is to ask what powers would be selected by
persons who did not already know their identities and interests. A
government that exercised the powers so identified would be "fair" or
"just" in Rawls's terminology.141 This assumption-what I would call
an insight-is the predicate for Rawls's heuristic device known as the
137. Elsewhere I have explored two alternative doctrinal methods whereby these groups
could be allowed to exercise powers that the federal government and states are constitutionally
foreclosed from exercising. See Rosen, Community-Based Interpretations, supra note 134; Mark
D. Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution: Geographical Variations of Constitutional Require-
ments in the Aid of Community, 77 TEx L. REv. 1129, 1138-90 (1999) [hereinafter Rosen, Our
Nonuniform Constitution]. These two alternatives are succinctly described and contrasted in
Rosen, Illiberal Societal Cultures, supra note 130, at 831-40.
138. See John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765, 783-84
(1997).
139. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999) (noting the social contractarian nature
of his analysis).
140. For a similar view, see Robert C. Post, Democratic Constitutionalism and Cultural
Heterogeneity, 25 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 185, 185 (2000) ("The enterprise of democratic
constitutionalism rests upon the premise of collective agency. If we ask who makes a democ-
ratic constitution, the answer must be given in the first person plural .... The collective agency
of the people constitutes a 'demos' capable of 'bestowing... democratic authority on a polity'")
(quoting J.H.H. Weiler, Does Europe Need Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German
Maastricht Decision, 1 EUR. L.J. 219, 238 (1995)). But see Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional
Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 111, 113, 115-32 (2003) (contending that the legitimacy of the
American Constitution cannot be grounded on consent, and proposing an alternative basis for
grounding the Constitution's legitimacy).
141. RAWLS, supra note 130, at 291.
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"original position." Under the original position, people are to
identify the fair political structure by conceiving themselves as being
under a "veil of ignorance" under which they "do not know the social
position, or the conception of the good (its particular aims and
attachments), or the realized abilities and psychological propensities,
and much else, of the persons they represent. '" 142 Because
the parties do not know whether the beliefs espoused by the per-
sons they represent is a majority or a minority view... [t]hey can-
not take chances by permitting a lesser liberty of conscience to
minority religions, say, on the possibility that those they represent
espouse a majority or dominant religion and will therefore have an
even greater liberty. For it may also happen that these persons be-
long to a minority faith and may suffer accordingly. If the parties
were to gamble in this way, they would show that they did not take
the religious, philosophical or moral convictions of persons seri-
ously, and, in effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical,
or moral conviction was. 143
The veil of ignorance thus is crucial to enabling people to transcend
their self-interests so as to identify a just and fair political structure.
Stated differently, the veil of ignorance transforms personal self-
interest into society-wide self-interest: people in the original position
will choose to accommodate everybody in a fair way because they do
not know whom they actually represent and accordingly would not
want to create a political structure that did not accommodate whom-
ever it is they happened to be.
2. The Need to Accommodate
Rawls argues that the original position generates two principles
of justice that should structure constitutional democracies. In my
earlier works I provided a lengthy textual analysis of this part of
Rawls's theory.'- I reworked Rawls's application of the principles of
justice because his analysis unnecessarily takes a position on con-
tested questions concerning human nature. I argued that founda-
tional Rawlsian premises are more fully achieved by taking account of
flexibility built into the federal political structure that Rawls ig-
nores. 45 For these reasons, some of my conclusions are explicitly at
variance with Rawls's. For instance, his analysis suggests that politi-
142. Id. at 305.
143. Id. at 311.
144. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1091-1106; Rosen, Illiberal Societal Cultures,
supra note 130, at 815-31.
145. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1106-25.
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cal perfectionists cannot be accommodated under liberalism. 146
Because I tinker so extensively with Rawls's approach, I refer to my
analysis as being "Rawlsian"; it is inspired by Rawls's principles, but
it is not a straightforward application of his theory1 47
Stripped of the formal derivation provided elsewhere, 148 my
analysis is as follows. A person in the original position, who by
definition does not know the religious or philosophical convictions of
the person she in fact is, must realize that she might be one of several
types of persons. She might be a separationist who wanted the
government to largely leave her alone in respect of contested reli-
gious, philosophical, and moral matters, 149 and who thought that
government involvement in such matters would interfere with her
ability to self-determine. On the other hand, she might be a political
perfectionist, that is, a person who believes that she could fully
develop herself only if the government actively involves itself in
religious, philosophical, or moral matters. 50 As mentioned above,
only those "integrationist" groups that believed that government's
involvement in religion is necessary for them to fully self-actualize
would qualify as political perfectionists.
What type of government structure would the person in the
original position opt for? She would not select a regime under which
the federal government could take a position on contested religious,
philosophical, or moral matters, because such a regime would
threaten to impose Cooterian or Sunsteinian expressive harms that
could preclude her from living her life as she saw fit. She would,
however, choose a regime under which subfederal governments could
take a position on such contested matters. Flatly disabling both the
146. He writes: "Suppose that a particular religion, and the conception of the good
belonging to it, can survive only if it controls the machinery of the state.... This religion will
cease to exist in the well-ordered society of political liberalism." RAwLS, supra note 130, at
196-97; see also id. at 62 (concluding that citizens or associations of citizens cannot "use the
state's police power to decide ... basic questions of justice as that person's, or that association's,
comprehensive doctrine directs"). I cite to both these statements in Rosen, Outer Limits, supra
note 54, at 1106-07.
147. Id. at 1063.
148. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1089-1125; Rosen, Illiberal Societal Cultures,
supra note 130, at 808-31.
149. Accordingly, government would not be disabled from regulating in respect of matters
that impacted relatively uncontested religious, philosophical, and moral matters, such as
prohibiting murder.
150. Under Rawls's account, such persons are excluded from the original position. See
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1120-23. In my earlier papers I explained why excluding
these persons is problematic under Rawls's own premises. See id. at 1121-23; Rosen, Illiberal
Societal Cultures, supra note 130, at 812-15.
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federal and subfederal polities from doing so-as our current Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine does-would disable her from living a full
life if she in fact represented an integrationist political perfectionist.
It would impose Cooterian and Sunsteinian expressive consequences
that a person in the original position would not willingly accept. Such
a political structure also would impose expressive harms of the sort
identified by Anderson and Pildes by communicating categorical
disrespect for the personal commitments of someone she might
represent. On the other hand, the subfederal polities would not be
free to do whatever they might wish, but would be subject to some
important soon-to-be-discussed limitations.1' It is this type of politi-
cal structure -a structure that maximizes the possibilities for political
diversity-that would be chosen by a person in the original position.
This Rawlsian analysis confirms a long recognized benefit of the
federal political structure. As Justice Harlan argued in Roth, the
federal system allows different states to pursue different moral
agendas. 152 In my view, this benefit is most usefully conceptualized
from the vantage point of living beings rather than the inanimate
state. Thusly reconceptualized, the advantage of federalism is that it
contains the potential of allowing a wider range of citizens' needs and
interests to be satisfied than does a single, nation-wide polity. This
potential benefit is squandered, however, if the federal and subfed-
eral polities enjoy identical limitations and powers.
It might be said, of course, that the very point of constitutional
law is to impose uniform requirements that, among other things, have
the effect of creating a single, national political culture. This observa-
tion is true, but it begs the question of what matters demand uniform-
ity-or, stated differently, what is the nature of our nation's political
culture? 153 That question, it seems to me, is answerable only by
means of a theory concerning human needs and the appropriate role
of the government-in short, by political theory.5 4 Which political
151. As I shall soon explain, these limitations would address many of the concerns
articulated by separationists. With regard to those concerns not allayed by Rawlsian limitations,
the Rawlsian analysis provided here suggests that separationist concerns should predominate
over integrationist concerns at the federal level, but that integrationist concerns should have
priority over the separationist concerns at the subfederal level.
152. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
153. For a fuller development of this point, see Rosen, Community-Based Interpretations,
supra note 134, at 1006-09.
154. Though it typically seeks to portray itself as being above the political fray, original-
ism-an approach I do not share-is one political theory; it is a theory of what powers are
enjoyed by government and its constituent branches.
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theory should be relied upon, of course, is a matter of deep contro-
versy. For the reasons mentioned above, I believe that a Rawlsian
analysis is instructive.'55 And such an analysis suggests that because
of the diversity of comprehensive doctrines that are held by our
country's citizens, our national political culture is best understood as
not demanding uniform requirements that unnecessarily prevent
political perfectionists from maintaining themselves over time, and
even flourishing. Insofar as sizing is one possible doctrinal mecha-
nism for accommodating integrationist political perfectionists, Rawl-
sian political theory provides a prima facie justification for sizing.
3. Limits on Accommodation
The analysis above showing the need to accommodate integra-
tionist political perfectionists does not mean that the Establishment
Clause properly imposes no limitations on subfederal sovereigns. But
the constraints imposed by the Establishment Clause ought to vary
depending upon which level of government is being restricted.
The appropriate limits on subfederal polities are best understood
by considering the limitations on the accommodation of political
perfectionists that Rawlsian theory imposes. Rawlsian theory gives
rise to several types of limitations. As a threshold matter, certain
political perfectionists-including, possibly, some integrationists-
cannot be accommodated. More specifically, because persons in the
original position would want to create a "well-ordered" political
society-conditions that permit and promote an "enduring and
secure" political regime1 6-they would not accommodate those
groups that were unwilling to live peacefully with others or to allow
other persons to govern themselves as they wish. 57 In short, liberal
theory suggests that the fair state can (and should) accommodate only
those groups that are tolerant in the sense that they are willing to let
nonmembers live as they wish. 15 8
In addition to limiting which groups can be accommodated,
Rawlsian political theory also suggests that there should be certain
restrictions on the activities that even qualifying groups can under-
take. These restrictions flow from two requirements: well-
155. See supra note 91.
156. RAWLS, supra note 130, at 38.
157. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1093-97.
158. This is a weaker form of toleration than Rawls embraces. For a description and
critique of Rawls's conception of toleration, see id. at 1110-14.
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orderedness and exit. Well-orderedness would prevent a group from
stockpiling weapons in anticipation of an Armageddon, for example,
or from seeking to establish relations with foreign countries in
contravention of United States policy. Furthermore, the requirement
of well-orderedness justifies the restriction of activities that might
impose significant externalities on those outside the group. For
example, it is conceivable that the anguish on the part of general
society on account of the activities undertaken in an enclave could
push general society to the breaking point and threaten well-
orderedness. It is doubtful that American society could tolerate
human sacrifice anywhere on American soil, for instance. Substan-
tive limitations of this sort on the activities that integrationist political
perfectionists can pursue within their enclaves are wholly appropri-
ate.
The original position suggests, however, that any such substan-
tive limitations should be few and far between; people in the original
position, not knowing whom they represented, would not select a
well-orderedness limitation that granted autonomy only to those
groups whose values mirrored those of general society.'59 Instead,
people in the original position who are creating the basic structure of
a large, diverse society would be aware of the "burdens of judg-
ment"- those factors that account for enduring disagreement among
people despite conscientious attempts to reason with others6°-and
adopt an attitude of toleration in respect of activities undertaken in
enclaves in which they elect not to live.' 6' For these reasons, those
seeking to substantively limit activities on the grounds that such
activities threaten to undermine well-orderedness should bear a very
high burden of proof.
Ultimately, what is required by well-orderedness is context-
dependent. It is a function of contemporary sensibilities and circum-
stances. It accordingly is subject to change as citizens's sensibilities
change. If citizens were to come to hold the Rawlsian view proposed
here-that their foundational commitments required that they
accommodate certain political perfectionists-then it would follow
that the scope of self-government consistent with well-orderedness
would increase. Relatedly, even if certain governmental action by
159. For a more extensive discussion of what well-orderedness may require, see Rosen,
Illiberal Societal Cultures, supra note 130, at 819-22.
160. See Rawls, supra note 138, at 805.
161. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1110-13.
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political perfectionists would not satisfy the requirement of well-
orderedness today due to contemporary sensibilities, this does not
mean that such governmental actions are per se incompatible with
Rawlsian political liberalism for all times. Quite clearly, distinguish-
ing between what liberalism categorically precludes from what only is
contingently precluded is crucial to understanding the scope of self-
governance at subfederal levels that liberalism can tolerate.
The limitations imposed by the requirement of well-orderedness
go far toward dispelling separationist concerns regarding sectarianism
and social strife along religious lines, for accommodation is required
only insofar as it would not lead to such social fissures.16 2 Not all
separationist concerns, however, would be allayed by the well-
orderedness requirement. Permitting some subfederal polities to
establish religion (more on what that means shortly163) may well
fragment the national political community in ways that are contrary
to separationism's commitments.' 64 A Rawlsian analysis suggests,
however, that the separationist's ideal for the national political
community collides with what liberalism requires. The separationist
notion of national unity wrongly comes at the expense of political
perfectionists. The original position's thought experiment demon-
strates that fairness requires a looser, less categorical conception of
the United States's national character than separationism champions.
A Rawlsian analysis suggests that these separationist concerns prop-
erly should be subordinated to the interests of qualifying political
perfectionists at the level of some subfederal polities. In short, a
national political culture characterized by an across-the-board com-
mitment to separationism is normatively problematic from a Rawlsian
perspective. A national political culture consistent with Rawlsian
liberalism would be willing to accommodate the integrationist policies
desired by qualifying political perfectionists at some subfederal levels
of government, subject to the caveats of well-orderedness and exit.
"Exit," the second limitation on subfederal sovereigns that a
Rawlsian analysis generates, refers to the requirement that persons
must have the right to move. Exit derives from Rawls's requirement
that the principles of justice require that the basic political structure
162. The requirement of well-orderedness also preserves one of liberalism's foremost
accomplishments of bringing about peace and avoiding sectarian conflicts of the sort found in
the centuries-long European religious wars. See RAWLS, supra note 130, at xxviii; KYMLICKA,
supra note 130, at 155.
163. See infra Part IV.
164. See supra p. 675.
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be "compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. '165 Without
the right to exit, persons born into a group they wished to leave, but
were prohibited from leaving, would not enjoy the same right to fully
live out their lives that was enjoyed by a nonperfectionist (for exam-
ple) that lived in a nonperfectioinist community. Persons in the
original position, not knowing whom they represented, accordingly
would choose a political structure in which people had a right to leave
whichever group with which they lived.166 The exit requirement
accordingly allays yet another concern underwriting the separationist
position. People's standing in their political community will turn on
their religion only if they consent to it, for the exit requirement
demands that people have the power to leave and accordingly to not
be subject to a subfederal polity that intermixes religion and govern-
ment. For this reason, Rawlsian liberalism cannot accommodate a
pure Aristotelian political community that sought the power to
paternalistically compel its citizens to stay and act morally so that
they become habituated to virtue. The exit requirement makes room
only for a paternalistic polity whose citizens commit to being bound
by a polity empowered to pursue nonsecular matters.
The exit right thus demands that no polity have the power to
preclude its inhabitants from exiting (with the exception of lawful
incarceration, which has this effect). Beyond that, polities cannot
make exiting so onerous (for example, by requiring the exiter to leave
behind all her real and personal property167) that it would be unrea-
sonable to expect a person to incur such costs to exercise an opt-out
right. But at what point is the cost of exiting too onerous? One can
begin to fill in the details of exit by asking how a person in the origi-
nal position would choose to construct the conditions that satisfy the
requirement of an opt-out. The original position, however, on its own
cannot definitively identify exit's contours because the original
position does not provide a mechanism for determining how risk-
averse its players are. 168 Such indeterminacy might be regretful, but it
is commonplace: political theory virtually always underdetermines
165. For a discussion of this, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1097-98.
166. For far greater elaboration of "exit," see id. at 1097-1106; Rosen, Illiberal Societal
Cultures, supra note 130, at 824-30. For an explanation as to why there likely is no parallel
requirement of "opt-in," see id. at 825-26.
167. For an example of a community that had such a rule, see Hofer v. Hofer, [1970] 13
D.L.R.3d 1 (Can.) (upholding Hutterites' power to condition exit on forfeiture of all private
property). Under the framework discussed above, the Canada Supreme Court's decision in
Hofer was incorrect.
168. For some implications of this, see, Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1099-1101.
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institutional details.169 Such underdetermination is something we live
with all the time-consider the open-endedness of our country's
constitutive commitments to "equal protection" and "due process,"
for instance-and is not an indication that the underlying theory is
flawed. Indeed, the process of working out the details of society's
commitments itself can be usefully conceptualized as being a part of a
healthy political community's process of constantly refining and
redefining itself.
Elsewhere I have begun to discuss factors that bear on exit. 70
One of the most difficult set of considerations concerns education, in
particular: how much knowledge about life outside the community in
which an individual finds herself, and how much training to support
oneself and otherwise survive in the outside world, is necessary for an
exit right to be real? 7' Exit poses extremely difficult questions, and I
will not repeat here the preliminary attempts I have made at answer-
ing them. 2 The point for present purposes is that under a Rawlsian
analysis, the requirements of well-orderedness and exit should guide
the doctrinal development of what limitations should apply to sub-
federal polities populated by political perfectionists. Although these
principles do not provide determinate answers in respect of many if
not most questions, they point in the right direction in a far more
specific way than does Justice Thomas's formulation in Zelman.'73
IV. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Particularly because this Essay's suggested approach varies in
some respects so much from contemporary Establishment Clause
doctrine, I hope in this final section to concretely clarify some of its
implications. Additionally, while I will be unable to provide determi-
nate answers to the vast majority of Establishment Clause issues that
169. See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 138, at 784 (noting that "details about how to satisfy this
proviso must be worked out in practice and cannot feasibly be governed by a clear family of
rules given in advance").
170. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1097-1106. I believe the analysis there to be
sound, except insofar as it is modified by what follows above in text.
171. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,241, 245-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting):
If a parent keeps his child out of school beyond the grade school, then the child will be
forever barred from entry into the new and amazing world of diversity that we have
today.... If he is harnessed to the Amish way of life by those in authority over him
and if his education is truncated, his entire life may be stunted and deformed.
172. For preliminary approaches, see Rosen, Illiberal Societal Cultures, supra note 130, at
827-28; Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1097-1106.
173. See discussion supra p. 694.
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could arise under sizing, I hope to illustrate by means of some specif-
ics the approach that Rawlsian analysis suggests should be taken to
resolving them.
A. "Multiple" Sizings
Even without delving into specifics, it should be clear that the
content of both the well-orderedness and exit constraints is likely to
vary depending on which level of government is acting. To begin, the
threat to the country's well-orderedness posed by a particular practice
undoubtedly is a function of the number of people who are participat-
ing in it; what happened in the two thousand acre town of Rajneesh-
puram surely would be less disruptive of our country's sense of itself
than if the entire State of California were owned and operated by the
Rajneesh, for example. 174 Similarly, with regard to exit, the extent to
which a polity can block its inhabitants' access to information about
life outside its borders is a function of size. A New York state-wide
ban on the sale of certain reading materials would mean that inhabi-
tants of certain counties would have to drive for hours to cross the
border to enter another state. A municipal ordinance has less reach
and accordingly is less likely to undermine the exit requirement.
The foregoing leads to the conclusion that Rawlsian analysis
provides support for a form of sizing that is more context-sensitive
than what has been discussed by even those justices who have con-
templated sizing. It suggests that constitutional limitations should be
scaled not only between the federal and state governments, but also
vis-A-vis states and substate polities. Stated differently, in addition to
the conclusion that subfederal polities should be permitted to take
positions on contestable issues that the federal government cannot-
the standard form of sizing discussed by Justices Holmes, Jackson,
Harlan and Thomas (among others)-a Rawlsian analysis suggests
that the limitations on the subfederal polities also may vary depend-
ing on what level of government (state or local) is acting. Generally
speaking, at least with regard to Establishment Clause protections, it
is to be expected that substate polities would be subject to less
restrictive constitutional constraints than states under sizing insofar as
174. For more on the Rajneesh, see supra pp. 679-80.
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smaller polities are less threatening than larger polities with regard to
well-orderedness and exitY.
B. Sizing and Neutrality
Earlier in the Essay I suggested that sizing provides an approach
to Establishment Clause conundrums that is more neutral than
contemporary doctrine. 176 The concept of neutrality is particularly
important to the Establishment Clause, for Establishment Clause
doctrine long has sought to ensure government neutrality. 177 How-
ever, the prospect for neutrality under the Establishment Clause, and
indeed the concept of neutrality more generally, has been subject to
trenchant criticism. Professor McConnell, among others, has argued
that any conception of neutrality must presuppose some baseline, and
that any such baseline inevitably is nonaxiomatic and contestable. 7 8
In a similar vein, Professor Smith has argued that the concept of
neutrality is "barren" and "useless"'179 for two dominant reasons:
because there are multiple conceptions of neutrality' 8° and because
"in a pluralistic culture, there is often no shared consensus" of its
meaning. 18 These are strong arguments against the possibility of
developing a doctrine that might be termed "absolutely" neutral, and
I will not attempt to defend any such concept of absolute neutrality
against such challenges. Nonetheless, even if there is no objective
view "from nowhere" 182 from which absolute neutrality can be identi-
fied, it seems to me to be quite possible to conclude that comparisons
among alternative doctrines can be made so that doctrinal options can
be ordinally ranked in terms of neutrality.
With this understanding, I make the following claim: the
Rawlsian-based approach to sizing developed here is more neutral
than the approach found in contemporary Establishment Clause
doctrine. To the extent that courts and scholars long have sought to
175. The conclusion that smaller polities should enjoy greater regulatory leeway does not
apply to all (or even necessarily most) constitutional provisions. See Rosen, Sizing Constitu-
tional Guarantees, supra note 8.
176. See supra p. 676.
177. See supra note 38.
178. See McConnell, supra note 88, at 148-49.
179. See Smith, supra note 38, at 325, 329; see generally id. at 320-31.
180. Id. at 322.
181. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
182. Cf. THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 6 (1986) (arguing that objectivity
"cannot by itself provide a complete picture of the world, or a complete stance toward it").
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understand the Clause's mandate as a requirement of government
neutrality,183 this Essay's suggestion accordingly can be understood as
a doctrinal improvement.
A fundamental question that necessarily arises when seeking to
assess neutrality concerns the relevant scope of inquiry: should one
look at the government whose actions are being challenged in a given
litigation or instead look more globally to all levels of government
within a country when analyzing a doctrine from the perspective of
neutrality? Once the question is asked, it seems clear to me that any
neutrality analysis of a federal constitutional doctrine ought to take
the second, global perspective. That is to say, the relevant question of
whether a particular United States constitutional doctrine results in a
more neutral outcome takes account of how the doctrine operates
throughout the entirety of the country. Focusing exclusively on the
particular level of government that happens to be challenged in a
single litigation-as contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine
does'84-is myopic.
Viewed from the perspective of all governments, sizing is more
neutral than contemporary doctrine insofar as it accommodates more
types of people. It is not wholly neutral-after all, the Rawlsian-
based approach to sizing discussed in this Essay would not accommo-
date all political perfectionists, it does not permit those groups it can
accommodate to do whatever they want without limitation, and it
does not satisfy all the concerns advanced by separationists. Whether
or not these lines demarcating what can be accomplished and what is
impossible are justifiable turns on some thick political theory, not the
concept of neutrality itself. Nonetheless, sizing would appear to be
more neutral than contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine from
virtually any perspective. Whereas contemporary law categorically
precludes the intermixing of religion and politics everywhere in the
United States, a Rawlsian-based sizing approach would prohibit the
federal government from imposing one approach across the country
but would allow a variety of approaches to be accommodated at the
subfederal level. For this reason, sizing is, at the very least, incremen-
183. See Smith, supra note 38, at 313-14.
184. Consider how the Court applies the endorsement test. The message communicated
always is adjudged solely in relation to what the challenged government's action is hypothesized
to mean. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Never have expressivist analysts sought to identify the aggregate message that is communicated
by taking into consideration not only the challenged government's activity but also the activities
of (let us say) other state governments and the federal government.
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tally better than contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine from
the perspective of neutrality.
C. Established Churches?
One might ask: would sizing open the door to permitting the full-
scale establishment of some governmental churches? Yes.185  The
constraint of well-orderedness, in particular, makes it unlikely that
there could be established state churches as there were in the nine-
teenth century, primarily due to the religious and cultural diversity
found in all states today. In my view, it is very possible, however, that
both the requirements of well-orderedness and exit could be satisfied
by an established municipal church in limited circumstances. A
relatively easy case, it seems to me, is presented by the city of Ra-
jneeshpuram. 186 Well-orderedness was not violated because the city
was of limited size and it was religiously homogeneous; the city was
not exercising political authority over non-Rajneesh or others who
did not want to be regulated by the polity. The requirements of exit
also appear to have been satisfied. The city's educational system
included science, math, social studies, and comparative cultures, and
the city planned to set a formal curriculum that was in accordance
with state guidelines. Moreover, inhabitants of the city were free to
leave, as many in fact did.187 Due to the powerful normative reasons
for permitting the Rajneesh to govern themselves as they deemed
appropriate,188 and the negligible costs of allowing them to do so, it
seems to me that the city of Rajneeshpuram was an ideal candidate to
have an established religion. Fleeing Taliban members would not be
permitted to set up their own municipality in Arizona, however, for
such a community would be unable to satisfy the well-orderedness
requirement (they presumably would not be willing to coexist peace-
185. To anticipate a possible objection, even full establishment of religion in the form of a
municipal church would not run afoul of constitutional requirements as a purely formal
doctrinal matter because the textual constitutional limitation on states is the Fourteenth
Amendment's requirement that they not violate liberty without due process, not that they not
establish religion. See supra note 108.
186. For more on the Rajneesh, see supra at pp. 679-80. In fact, even the city of Rajneesh-
puram did not technically have an established church. The city was owned and operated by a
corporation, not the church. See Oregon v. City of Rajneeshpuram, 598 F. Supp. 1208, 1214-15
(D. Or. 1984); Rosen, Our Nonuniform Constitution, supra note 137, at 1183. The corporation,
however, was wholly owned by the church. Id.
187. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1132.
188. See id. at 1131-32.
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fully with their neighbors) and accordingly would not be a candidate
for accommodation under the Rawlsian approach sketched above.
It is quite possible that the requirement of well-orderedness
would prohibit cities with mixed religious populations from adopting
full-fledged established churches. That is to say, established local
churches likely would be permissible only in the rare instance where
municipal boundaries coincided with a homogeneous population of
political perfectionists that was desirous of establishment. Such
polities are rare, to be sure, but they may exist.189
Many complex issues would arise under such an approach. Here
are a few. Consider first the relevant time period for determining
whether the population is homogeneous: is it the time of establish-
ment or is it an ongoing obligation? This Essay's analysis suggests
that the answer is the time of establishment. Otherwise, a pernicious
incentive would be created that would encourage any individual who
was philosophically opposed to establishment anywhere to surrepti-
tiously purchase or rent property in the integrationist community to
thereby disrupt its homogeneity. The rule I suggest appears to do no
violence to well-orderedness or exit, and it better advances a just
liberal state by not permitting a single mobile dissenter (who is willing
to relocate to an integrationist community) to interfere with an
integrationist community's ability to govern their lives as they deem
necessary.
Next, one might wonder whether the proposed homogeneity re-
quirement could be circumvented, and well-orderedness thereby
undermined, were groups to simply create new subfederal polities in
states that have laws permitting easy incorporation of local govern-
ments such as towns and villages.190 Even a proliferation of such local
governments, however, would not constitute a circumvention of the
homogeneity requirement or a threat to well-orderedness as a per se
matter.191 So long as the resulting polity ruled over a homogeneous
population, what would be the problem? Indeed, a proliferation of
small local governments may well be beneficial. The primary benefit
189. For a discussion of some of potential candidates, see Board of Education of Kiryas Joel
Village School District v. Grumet, 511 U.S. 687, 735-36 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. Under New York state law, for example, a territory with at least 500 residents and not
more than five square miles may be incorporated upon petition by at least twenty percent of the
voting residents of that territory or by the owners of more than fifty percent of the territory's
real property. See N.Y. Village Law §§ 2-200, 2-202 (McKinney 1973 and Supp. 1994).
191. See supra pp. 702-03 (discussing the fact that what is required under the requirement of
well-orderedness depends on citizens' values and sensibilities, which may change over time).
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is that each government can cater to the idiosyncratic needs of its
constituents.192 Although there are certain efficiency risks entailed by
large numbers of small local governments-notably the possibility of
wasteful duplication and lost scales of economy-many of these
potential costs can be avoided by means of interlocal agreements and
other forms of joint action among substate polities. 93
Though the creation of many new local governments does not
undermine well-orderedness as a per se matter, there are certain risks
due to sizing's interaction with other state laws. In developing the
contours of the constitutional constraint of well-orderedness-which
could be textually grounded either in the Fourteenth Amendment's
liberty guarantee or in the language of the Establishment Clause
itself- courts would have to be attentive to the fact that the doctrine
would have to be highly context sensitive. For example, well-
orderedness could be threatened if state law provided that substate
polities could annex other substate polities by means of a majority
vote of the citizens of a combination of the annexing and to-be-
annexed polities. 94 Such an annexation rule, in combination with the
time of incorporation rule discussed above, would effectively allow a
single polity with an established church to successively annex smaller
unconsenting polities that did not have established churches. The
constitutional requirement of well-orderedness accordingly would
have to disallow application of such an annexation law in these
circumstances.
D. Funding, Symbolism, and Coercion
To date, of course, virtually all subfederal polities that have faced
Establishment Clause challenges have not sought to adopt full-
fledged churches or even to delegate political power to churches. 95
Instead, contemporary Establishment Clause battles largely have
192. Cf. Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956).
193. See generally GERALD E. FRUG ET AL., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 463-549 (3d ed.
2001).
194. This type of annexation statute is very common. It was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court in an early decision. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907). A
federal district court has upheld a state annexing statute under which only citizens of the
annexing city could vote. See Moorman v. Wood, 504 F. Supp. 467, 473-74 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
Such an annexation statute also would be problematic, of course, and would have to be subject
to the constitutional restrictions discussed below in text.
195. It could be expected, however, that more such attempts would be made if this Essay's
suggestions were adopted.
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concerned the permissibility of government involvement in ceremo-
nies with religious overtones (such as allowing creches to be erected
at city hall and benedictions at graduation ceremonies) and govern-
ment funding of religious institutions. Under sizing, some subfederal
polities could be granted considerably more regulatory leeway than
they currently enjoy in respect of many of these matters. Consider
the funding issue that the Supreme Court recently resolved in the
Zelman case. 196 The Court upheld Ohio's voucher program because
the cities directed voucher money to parents, not to parochial
schools.' 91 Under the Court's reasoning, although such indirect
financing of religious schools did not violate the Establishment
Clause, direct financing would.198 From a Rawlsian perspective,
however, even if direct federal financing of religious schools consti-
tuted a prohibited establishment of religion, it is not at all clear that a
local government's direct financing should. The relevant question is
whether the subfederal polity's policy threatened well-orderedness or
exit. It is not readily apparent how direct funding would implicate
these concerns.
This does not mean, however, that local governments populated
by a majority of political perfectionists would have a free hand to do
as they please in respect of schools under sizing. The requirement of
exit, as well as the independent constitutional right of free exercise,
would place limitations on local governments' abilities to coerce
student participation in such things as prayer.' 99 The exit requirement
also would impose educational constraints that would be operative in
both public and parochial schools. For example, students would have
to receive enough information about life outside their community so
that they could make informed decisions to remain or leave. 2°° Under
this approach, although a school curriculum that only taught creation-
196. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
197. Id. at 648-51.
198. See id. at 649 ("our decisions have drawn a consistent distinction between government
programs that provide aid directly to religious schools.., and program of true private choice, in
which government aid reaches religious schools only as a result of the genuine and independent
choices of private individuals" (citations omitted)).
199. This is consistent with current doctrine. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
200. For more on this, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1102-04. For the
suggestion that this requirement is unrealistic and problematic under some understandings of
human nature, see Rosen, Illiberal Societal Cultures, supra note 130, at 827-28.
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ism would be problematic, a curriculum that taught both evolution
and creationism might not be.20'
On the other hand, it might be the case that the introduction of
sectarian materials into a school curriculum would be barred under
the requirement of well-orderedness. Those who are not members of
the religious majority can be expected to take great umbrage at the
introduction of such materials into the classroom,2° and the degree of
upset may well disrupt the well-orderedness that people in the
original position would wish their society to enjoy. 203 What should
drive the legal analysis is not the question of whether a statute does
or does not bear a secular purpose-what is asked under today's
blackletter law24-but the statute's likely impact as regards well-
orderedness. In short, sizing would permit some governments (local
governments to be sure, and perhaps state governments) to actively
advance some nonsecular purposes, but not all. Stated differently,
Rawlsian analysis suggests, and sizing can operationalize, the princi-
ple that nonestablishmentarianism at each and every level of govern-
ment is not a requirement of liberal constitutionalism as an a priori
matter.
One possible consequence of subjecting some local governments
to fewer constitutional constraints than state governments would be
to set in motion a "procedural" battle over what level of government
has legislative jurisdiction over sharply contested political issues. For
example, opponents of direct funding may try to centralize education
to the state level, hoping that the state government will be subject to
stricter constitutional limitations than local governments. This is true,
but is not dispositive, for this dynamic is not confined to sizing, but
rather is a natural byproduct of a federal system in which the different
levels of government have divergent powers. Indeed, the determina-
tion of what level of nonfederal government has the power to regu-
late almost always is a matter of state law, 25 and battles over which
201. This is contrary to contemporary doctrine. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578
(1987).
202. For an example of a state statute that did this very thing, see School District of
Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Pennsylvania statute required reading
from the New Testament).
203. See supra pp. 702-03 (discussing the fact that what is required by well-orderedness is a
function of citizens' sensibilities and may change over time).
204. See generally Koppelmann, supra note 38, at 88.
205. There are only minimal federal constitutional limitations with regard to how political
power is allocated as between the state and substate polities.
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governmental level has regulatory power already are common.2 6
Such battles sometimes are explicitly driven by the understanding
that one level of government is constitutionally permitted to act in a
manner that another level of government cannot.07 More generally,
insofar as federal systems by definition are political arrangements in
which different levels of government have different powers, struggles
concerning which level of government has power in regard to a given
task would appear to be endemic to the federal political structure.
Understanding this reduces, if not eliminates, the concern that sizing
may lead to struggles over which level of government ought to
exercise regulatory power over contested matters. Such battles, after
all, are a natural concomitant of a federal system.
Moreover, it is possible that sizing would not lead to sharpened
battles concerning the distribution of power among subfederal
polities. Although democratic theory does not offer a way of answer-
ing the question of at what level of government a particular issue
ought to be resolved,2 ° Rawisian liberal theory does. As discussed
above, it suggests that many issues about which there is sharp dispute
in society should be decided differently by different subfederal
polities. This is what the person in the original position would select,
for she would not wish to create a political structure that would not
accommodate her if she happened to be a political perfectionist who
was willing to peacefully coexist with other groups (and that accord-
ingly satisfied the requirement of well-orderedness). This is the type
of tolerance that Rawlsian liberalism calls for.209 Well-orderedness
requires that citizens be educated to be tolerant in these ways.210 To
206. See, e.g., Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review and Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 260
N.E. 2d 200 (Mass. 1970) (determining that rent control is to be decided at state-wide rather
than municipal-wide level).
207. See, e.g., Mun. Bldg. Auth. v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273 (Utah 1985) (holding that building
authority is constitutionally permitted to issue bonds for financing jail without voter approval
whereas county may not).
208. Resolving the question implicates the following question: of what group must there be
a majority to justify a political decision? Stated differently, if "x" represents the number of
people in a polity, democratic theory says that political action is justified if the following number
of people vote for it: x + 1 divided by x. The question that democratic theory cannot answer,
however, is the size of the denominator, that is, of x: is it a town, city, or state? The smaller the
group of which there must be a majority, the more likely it is that a given group that constitutes
a minority of the entire population nonetheless will be able to politically express its will within
its local government. See generally ROBERT DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY
96-100 (1982) (noting the "dilemma" of "a more exclusive versus a more inclusive demos" and
concluding that there is no determinate theoretical solution as to how large a democratic polity
should be).
209. See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 54, at 1110-14.
210. See id. at 1097.
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the extent this education is successful, even citizens who disagree with
the policies (such as establishment) that sizing would tolerate at the
substate level may restrain themselves from seeking to centralize
policymaking at the state level so as to impose their preferred policies
on everybody else.
CONCLUSION
Law's expressive dimensions may have implications with regard
to the sizing of constitutional protections. It is not inevitable that a
given constitutional protection must apply in identical ways to the
different levels of government in our country's federal system.
Expressive analysis shows that the Constitution's social meaning, in
respect of the Establishment Clause, varies considerably depending
upon which level of government is being constrained. Awareness of
what is at stake for adversaries in Establishment Clause conflicts
makes it clear that contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine,
which makes no distinction between the federal and subfederal
governments, generates significant expressive consequences and
thereby creates cultural winners and cultural losers. Sizing can
reduce these cultural costs and generate more neutral outcomes than
is possible under the current doctrine.
Whether sizing is desirable ultimately turns on considerations of
political theory. Rawlsian political theory, a promising approach to
identifying democratically constitutional governmental institutions,
provides a justification for sizing in some instances. Although sizing
would allow certain subfederal polities greater leeway than current
law permits, it is not the equivalent of wholly freeing states or mu-
nicipalities from constitutional limitations in respect of Establishment
Clause protections. Rawlsian analysis suggests that as regards
political perfectionists, the appropriate constitutional limitations are
those constraints that are generated by the requirements of well-
orderedness and exit. These limitations are more modest than the
constraints that typically apply to the federal and subfederal govern-
ments under current doctrine.
Finally, it bears mention that although the reader might disagree
with either my choice of Rawls, or my interpretation of Rawls for
purposes of determining how sizing the Establishment Clause ought
to proceed, this Essay's Rawlsian argument in Parts III.B and IV is
independent of the analysis that comes before. That is to say, rejec-
tion of this Essay's Rawlsian analysis says nothing of the Article's first
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four arguments: (1) that there are large-scale cultural winners and
losers under contemporary Establishment Clause doctrine; (2) that
these cultural consequences have expressivist consequences that
prima facie may have doctrinal consequences under an expressivist
account; (3) that sizing is a plausible option that may alleviate some
of current Establishment Clause doctrine's expressivist harms; and (4)
that determining whether and how to size ultimately turns on a thick
political theory. Much will have been accomplished if this Essay
encourages debate on the fifth issue of what thick political theory
ought to inform the scope of sizing.
